Concentric Clientelism: A Case Study of Rural Saharanpur

This is the Author Manuscript. Version on Record published in STUDIES IN INDIAN POLITICS, Volume: 6 issue: 2, page(s): 247-266 (2018)

29 Pages Posted: 17 Oct 2019

See all articles by Rahul Hemrajani

Rahul Hemrajani

National Law School of India University, Bangalore

Rajkamal Singh

University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) - Department of Political Science

Date Written: September 23, 2018

Abstract

In this paper, we examine the role of intermediaries in sustaining political clientelism in rural Saharanpur, Uttar Pradesh. Drawing from fieldwork and electoral data, we show that clientelism in Saharanpur is based around providing three specific guarantees to the voter – security from or by the police, facilitation in the tehsil and mediation in cases that would otherwise go to court – which we collectively refer to as Guardianship. We explain how Guardianship, more than most other forms of clientelistic exchange, requires intermediaries. In the case of Saharanpur, these intermediaries are usually individuals occupying formal positions of power within various circles of Panchayati Raj Institutions. Finally, we argue that it is the concentric nature of constituencies provided by the decentralized political structure which is ultimately responsible for the sustenance of intermediary networks as well as the perpetuation of clientelism in rural Saharanpur.

Keywords: Clientelism; Patronage; Vote-buying; Brokers; Intermediaries

Suggested Citation

Hemrajani, Rahul and Singh, Rajkamal, Concentric Clientelism: A Case Study of Rural Saharanpur (September 23, 2018). This is the Author Manuscript. Version on Record published in STUDIES IN INDIAN POLITICS, Volume: 6 issue: 2, page(s): 247-266 (2018), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3459213 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3459213

Rahul Hemrajani (Contact Author)

National Law School of India University, Bangalore ( email )

Bengaluru

Rajkamal Singh

University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) - Department of Political Science ( email )

Ellison Hall
Santa Barbara, CA 93106
United States

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