Online Appendix: Persuading the Principal to Wait
68 Pages Posted: 14 Oct 2019
Date Written: September 25, 2019
A principal decides when to exercise a real option. A biased agent influences this decision by strategically disclosing information. Committing to disclose all information with delay is the optimal way to persuade the principal to wait. Without dynamic commitment, this promise is credible only if the agent’s bias is small; otherwise, he pipets information, probabilistically delaying the principal’s action. When the agent is biased towards early exercise, his lack of commitment to remain quiet leads to immediate disclosure, hurting him. Our model applies to pharmaceutical companies conducting clinical trials to influence the FDA or equipment manufacturers testing their products.
Keywords: strategic communication, bayesian persuasion, dynamic games, real options
JEL Classification: C73, D83
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation