How Are Firms Sold? The Role of Common Ownership

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Forthcoming. 

71 Pages Posted: 10 Oct 2019 Last revised: 3 Dec 2024

See all articles by M. Vahid Irani

M. Vahid Irani

University of South Carolina - Darla Moore School of Business

Wenhao Yang

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Charlotte - Finance

Feng Zhang

Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Finance Department

Date Written: November 10, 2024

Abstract

We find that common ownership among acquirers enhances rather than hinders competition in the firm sale process. One common owner raises the likelihood that target firms are sold through auction (versus negotiation with one buyer) by 21.5%. The effect is causal according to identifications based on mergers between financial institutions. Exploring economic channels, we observe selling firms respond to common ownership among acquirers by avoiding cross-owned acquirers, by bargaining hard, by inviting more buyers when cross-owned acquirers initiate the deal, but not by terminating the deal. Consistent with enhanced competition, common ownership among acquirers is positively associated with deal quality. 

Keywords: common ownership, auction, negotiation, mergers and acquisitions

JEL Classification: D44, G34, L41

Suggested Citation

Irani, M. Vahid and Yang, Wenhao and Zhang, Feng, How Are Firms Sold? The Role of Common Ownership (November 10, 2024). Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Forthcoming. , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3461284 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3461284

M. Vahid Irani (Contact Author)

University of South Carolina - Darla Moore School of Business ( email )

1014 Greene Street
Columbia, SC 29208
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sc.edu/study/colleges_schools/moore/directory/irani_mohammad.php

Wenhao Yang

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Charlotte - Finance ( email )

9201 University City Boulevard
Charlotte, NC 28223
United States

Feng Zhang

Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Finance Department ( email )

SMU Cox School of Business
6212 Bishop Blvd
Dallas, TX 75275
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/fengzhangfin

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