Power Sharing, Mobilization, and Party Organization

33 Pages Posted: 11 Oct 2019 Last revised: 15 Oct 2019

See all articles by Giovanna Maria Invernizzi

Giovanna Maria Invernizzi

Columbia University - Department of Political Science

Carlo Prato

Columbia University - Department of Political Science

Date Written: September 30, 2019

Abstract

We study the internal organization of political parties as the solution of a moral hazard problem between a party principal (or selectorate) and two factions. Factional mobilization effort bolsters a party's electoral chances but can only be imperfectly monitored – via an internal contest. We model a party's internal organization as a system of "prizes,'' an allocation of resources between winner and loser of the internal contest. We show that when (i) a party's baseline electoral strength is low and (ii) electoral outcomes are not too responsive to mobilization efforts (e.g., when the electorate is polarized), there is an inverse relationship between inter-party power sharing and intra-party power sharing: institutional settings that award more resources and policy influence to election winners should feature parties whose internal organization features a more egalitarian allocation of power across factions. Our results help organize the empirically documented dispersion in party organizational structures (leadership autonomy, centralization of candidate selection, and the formal recognition of factions in the party statute).

Keywords: Power Sharing, Party Organization, Political Contests

JEL Classification: D02, D72

Suggested Citation

Invernizzi, Giovanna Maria and Prato, Carlo, Power Sharing, Mobilization, and Party Organization (September 30, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3462071 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3462071

Giovanna Maria Invernizzi

Columbia University - Department of Political Science ( email )

7th Floor, International Affairs Bldg.
420 W. 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States

Carlo Prato (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Department of Political Science ( email )

7th Floor, International Affairs Bldg.
420 W. 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States

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