Power Sharing, Mobilization, and Party Organization

42 Pages Posted: 11 Oct 2019 Last revised: 14 Jul 2021

See all articles by Giovanna Maria Invernizzi

Giovanna Maria Invernizzi

Columbia University - Department of Political Science

Carlo Prato

Columbia University - Department of Political Science

Date Written: September 30, 2019

Abstract

We study the internal organization of political parties as the solution of a moral hazard problem between a party principal (or selectorate) and two factions. Factional mobilization effort bolsters a party’s electoral chances but can only be imperfectly monitored—via an internal contest. We model a party’s internal organization as a system of “prizes,” an al- location of resources between winner and loser of the internal contest. We show that when (i) a party’s baseline electoral strength is low and (ii) electoral outcomes are not too responsive to mobilization efforts, there is an inverse relationship between inter-party power sharing and intra-party power sharing: institutional settings that award more resources and policy influence to election winners should produce party structures that promote a more egalitarian allocation of power across factions. Our results help organize the empirically documented dispersion in party organizational structures.

Keywords: Power Sharing, Party Organization, Political Contests

JEL Classification: D02, D72

Suggested Citation

Invernizzi, Giovanna Maria and Prato, Carlo, Power Sharing, Mobilization, and Party Organization (September 30, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3462071 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3462071

Giovanna Maria Invernizzi

Columbia University - Department of Political Science ( email )

New York, NY
United States

Carlo Prato (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Department of Political Science ( email )

7th Floor, International Affairs Bldg.
420 W. 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States

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