Bending the Iron Law

Abstract

How is power shared within political parties? Michels' iron law of oligarchy predicts concentration of power to achieve efficiency. We study the internal organization of parties as the solution of a moral hazard problem between a party principal (or conference) and two factions. Factional mobilization effort bolsters a party's electoral chances but can only be imperfectly monitored---via an internal contest. We model a party's internal organization as a system of ``prizes,'' an allocation of resources between winner and loser of the internal contest. We uncover conditions under which, contrary to Michels' iron law, intra-party power-sharing arises: institutional settings that award more resources and policy influence to election winners should produce party structures that promote a more egalitarian allocation of power across factions. This form of internal party democracy should be more frequent within smaller parties and in settings where activists' mobilization is less consequential for electoral success (e.g., with strong partisan attachments).

Keywords: Power Sharing, Party Organization, Political Contests

JEL Classification: D02, D72