Sensitivity, Safety, and the Law: A Reply to Pardo

Abstract

In his recent “Safety vs. Sensitivity”, Michael Pardo argues that Sensitivity in fact plays no role in guiding or explaining legal doctrine, nor should it. En route to this conclusion, he also criticizes our attempt (in previous work) to utilize Sensitivity in order to shed light on the problem of statistical evidence.

This paper is, to a considerable extent, a reply to Pardo. But it is, we hope, also of wider interest. Pardo’s discussion serves also as a good opportunity to revisit issues at the intersection of law and epistemology, both in specific terms (like the legal role, if any, of Sensitivity and Safety, or what to say of statistical evidence), and more generally (about how, if at all, legal theory should incorporate epistemological discussions). We happily take advantage of this opportunity, then, offering both specific critiques of and replies to Pardo’s discussion, and more general points that are of interest also independently of our exchange.

Keywords: Sensitivity, Safety, Statistical Evidence, Legal Epistemology