Sensitivity, Safety, and the Law: A Reply to Pardo

26 Pages Posted: 11 Oct 2019 Last revised: 22 Sep 2020

See all articles by David Enoch

David Enoch

Hebrew University - The Philosophy Department and the Law School

Levi Spectre

Open University of Israel

Date Written: October 1, 2019

Abstract

In his recent “Safety vs. Sensitivity”, Michael Pardo argues that Sensitivity in fact plays no role in guiding or explaining legal doctrine, nor should it. En route to this conclusion, he also criticizes our attempt (in previous work) to utilize Sensitivity in order to shed light on the problem of statistical evidence.

This paper is, to a considerable extent, a reply to Pardo. But it is, we hope, also of wider interest. Pardo’s discussion serves also as a good opportunity to revisit issues at the intersection of law and epistemology, both in specific terms (like the legal role, if any, of Sensitivity and Safety, or what to say of statistical evidence), and more generally (about how, if at all, legal theory should incorporate epistemological discussions). We happily take advantage of this opportunity, then, offering both specific critiques of and replies to Pardo’s discussion, and more general points that are of interest also independently of our exchange.

Keywords: Sensitivity, Safety, Statistical Evidence, Legal Epistemology

Suggested Citation

Enoch, David and Spectre, Levi, Sensitivity, Safety, and the Law: A Reply to Pardo (October 1, 2019). Legal Theory, 2019, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Legal Research Paper 20-28, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3462424 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3462424

David Enoch (Contact Author)

Hebrew University - The Philosophy Department and the Law School ( email )

Mount Scopus
Mount Scopus, IL 91905
Israel

Levi Spectre

Open University of Israel ( email )

1 University Road
Tel-Aviv, 61392
Israel

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
45
Abstract Views
347
PlumX Metrics