An Analysis of Allocation Phase Pricing and Clock Round Price Increases in the Canadian 600 MHz Auction
6 Pages Posted: 15 Oct 2019
Date Written: September 20, 2019
The 600 MHz auction conducted by Innovation, Science, and Economic Development (ISED) in Canada was a Combinatorial Clock Auction (CCA) that used a spectrum set-aside to prevent three large national wireless providers—specifically, Bell, Rogers, and Telus—from winning the entirety of the spectrum at auction. The product space was divided into 16 geographic areas, and seven 2x5 MHz block were available in each area. Within the context of the ISED consultation regarding auction design for the 3500 MHz tender, respondents have commented on certain aspects of the 600 MHz auction design as it relates to the set-aside and to price determination in the 600 MHz auction. The purpose of this paper is to provide interested parties with an accurate understanding of pricing in the Canadian 600 MHz auction of 2019. This paper does not take a position on any proposed design elements of the 3500 MHz auction in Canada. We find that set-aside eligible bidders in the 600 MHz auction did not significantly affect the base prices that Rogers or Telus paid for 600 MHz spectrum. In addition, an examination of clock round bidding behavior shows that open prices did not increase significantly due to bidding from set-aside eligible bidders.
Keywords: Spectrum Auction, Combinatorial Clock Auction, Canada, 600 MHz, Competitive Measures, Set-Aside, Entrants
JEL Classification: D44
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation