Hedge Fund Regulation and Fund Governance: Evidence on the Effects of Mandatory Disclosure Rules
Posted: 6 Oct 2019
Date Written: September 1, 2019
This paper uses three alternating changes in hedge fund regulation to study whether regulation reduces hedge funds’ misreporting, and, if so, why regulation is effective. Relative to public companies, hedge fund regulation is relatively light. Much of the regime is a “comply‐or‐explain” framework that allows funds to forego compliance with governance rules, providing that they disclose their lack of compliance. The results show that regulation reduces misreporting at hedge funds. Further analysis suggests that the disclosure requirements led funds to make changes in their internal governance, such as hiring or switching the fund's auditor, and that these changes induced funds to report their financial performance more accurately.
Keywords: mandatory disclosure; hedge funds; SEC regulation; financial misreporting; auditing
JEL Classification: G20; G23; G28; K22; M42; M48
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation