Matching with Externalities
47 Pages Posted: 7 Oct 2019
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Matching with Externalities
Date Written: September 2019
Abstract
We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the classical substitutes condition to allow for externalities, we establish that stable matchings exist when agent choices satisfy substitutability. Furthermore, we show that substitutability is a necessary condition for the existence of a stable matching in a maximal-domain sense and provide a characterization of substitutable choice functions. In addition, we establish novel comparative statics on externalities and show that the standard insights of matching theory, like the existence of side-optimal stable matchings and the deferred acceptance algorithm, remain valid despite the presence of externalities even though the standard fixed-point techniques do not apply.
JEL Classification: C78, D47, D62
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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Matching with Externalities
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