Trading and Shareholder Voting

61 Pages Posted: 7 Oct 2019

See all articles by Doron Levit

Doron Levit

University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Nadya Malenko

Boston College, Carroll School of Management, Students; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Ernst G. Maug

University of Mannheim Business School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2019

Abstract

We study shareholder voting in a model in which trading affects the composition of the shareholder base. In this model, trading and voting are complementary, which gives rise to self-fulfilling expectations about proposal acceptance. We show three main results. First, increasing liquidity and trading opportunities may reduce prices and welfare, because it allows shareholders with more extreme preferences to accumulate large positions and impose their views on more moderate shareholders through voting. Second, prices and welfare can move in opposite directions, which suggests that the former is an invalid proxy for the latter. Third, delegation of the decision to a board of directors may strictly improve shareholder value. However, the optimal board is generally biased, should not be representative of current shareholders, and may not always garner voting support from the majority of shareholders.

Keywords: corporate governance, Shareholder rights, Trading, voting

JEL Classification: D74, D82, D83, G34, K22

Suggested Citation

Levit, Doron and Malenko, Nadya and Maug, Ernst G., Trading and Shareholder Voting (October 2019). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14039. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3465751

Doron Levit (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department ( email )

The Wharton School
3620 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

Nadya Malenko

Boston College, Carroll School of Management, Students ( email )

Boston, MA
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

Ernst G. Maug

University of Mannheim Business School ( email )

L9, 1-2
Mannheim, 68131
Germany
+49 621 181-1952 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://cf.bwl.uni-mannheim.de/de/people/maug/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

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