Trading and Shareholder Democracy
60 Pages Posted: 7 Oct 2019 Last revised: 27 May 2022
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Trading and Shareholder Democracy
Date Written: October 2019
Abstract
We study shareholder voting in a model in which trading affects the composition of the shareholder base. Trading and voting are complementary, which gives rise to self-fulfilling expectations about proposal acceptance and multiple equilibria. Prices and shareholder welfare can move in opposite directions, so the former may be an invalid proxy for the latter. Relaxing trading frictions can reduce welfare, because it allows extreme shareholders to gain more weight in voting. Delegating decision-making to the board can help overcome collective action problems at the voting stage. We also analyze the role of index investors and social concerns of shareholders.
Keywords: corporate governance, delegation, Shareholder rights, Trading, voting
JEL Classification: D74, D83, G34, K22
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Doron Levit (Contact Author)
University of Washington, Foster School of Business ( email )
434 Paccar Hall, 4273 E Stevens Way NE
Seattle, WA 98195
United States
Nadya Malenko
University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )
701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI MI 48109
United States