The Economic Effects of Private Equity Buyouts

69 Pages Posted: 9 Oct 2019

See all articles by Steven J. Davis

Steven J. Davis

University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Hoover Institution

John Haltiwanger

University of Maryland - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Kyle Handley

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - School of Global Policy & Strategy; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Ben Lipsius

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor

Josh Lerner

Harvard Business School - Finance Unit; Harvard University - Entrepreneurial Management Unit; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Javier Miranda

US Census Bureau — Economy-Wide Statistics Division

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 7, 2019

Abstract

We examine thousands of U.S. private equity (PE) buyouts from 1980 to 2013, a period that saw huge swings in credit market tightness and GDP growth. Our results show striking, systematic differences in the real-side effects of PE buyouts, depending on buyout type and external conditions. Employment at target firms shrinks 13% over two years in buyouts of publicly listed firms but expands 13% in buyouts of privately held firms, both relative to contemporaneous outcomes at control firms. Labor productivity rises 8% at targets over two years post buyout (again, relative to controls), with large gains for both public-to-private and private-to-private buyouts. Target productivity gains are larger yet for deals executed amidst tight credit conditions. A post-buyout widening of credit spreads or slowdown in GDP growth lowers employment growth at targets and sharply curtails productivity gains in public-to-private and divisional buyouts. Average earnings per worker fall by 1.7% at target firms after buyouts, largely erasing a pre-buyout wage premium relative to controls. Wage effects are also heterogeneous. In these and other respects, the economic effects of private equity vary greatly by buyout type and with external conditions.

Suggested Citation

Davis, Steven J. and Haltiwanger, John C. and Handley, Kyle and Lipsius, Ben and Lerner, Josh and Miranda, Javier, The Economic Effects of Private Equity Buyouts (October 7, 2019). Harvard Business School Entrepreneurial Management Working Paper No. 20-046, Harvard Business School Finance Working Paper No. 20-046, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3466233 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3466233

Steven J. Davis

University of Chicago ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-7312 (Phone)
773-702-0458 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Hoover Institution

434 Galvez Mall
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-6010
United States
773 251 1795 (Phone)

John C. Haltiwanger

University of Maryland - Department of Economics ( email )

College Park, MD 20742
United States
301-405-3504 (Phone)
301-405-3542 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Kyle Handley

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - School of Global Policy & Strategy ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive #0519
La Jolla, CA 92093-0519
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.kylehandley.com

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Ben Lipsius

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor ( email )

Josh Lerner (Contact Author)

Harvard Business School - Finance Unit ( email )

Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-495-6065 (Phone)
617-496-7357 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.people.hbs.edu/jlerner/

Harvard University - Entrepreneurial Management Unit

Cambridge, MA 02163
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Javier Miranda

US Census Bureau — Economy-Wide Statistics Division ( email )

Washington, DC
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
228
Abstract Views
1,444
Rank
4,102
PlumX Metrics