Assessing DOJ’s Proposed Remedy in Sprint/T-Mobile: Can Ex Ante Competitive Conditions in Wireless Markets Be Restored?

14 Pages Posted: 21 Oct 2019

See all articles by Nicholas Economides

Nicholas Economides

New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics

John E. Kwoka, Jr.

Northeastern University - Department of Economics

Thomas Philippon

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Robert Seamans

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business

Hal J. Singer

Econ One

Marshall Steinbaum

University of Utah Department of Economics

Lawrence J. White

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics

Date Written: October 10, 2019

Abstract

As economists with significant experience in competition and regulatory matters, we offer comments on the remedies proposed by the Department of Justice to address the competitive effects flowing from the proposed merger of Sprint and T-Mobile, as recognized by the DOJ’s Complaint. We find that the Proposed Final Judgment cannot and will not address the anticompetitive harms identified in the Complaint, or restore the ex ante competitive conditions in the affected antitrust product markets. By eliminating Sprint as an independent competitor, the Sprint/T-Mobile merger, even in the presence of DOJ’s proposed remedy, would inflict serious antitrust injury on consumers and competition.

Keywords: Telecommunications; Merger; Tunney Act; Sprint; T-Mobile; Dish; DOJ

JEL Classification: L1, L4, L5, L9

Suggested Citation

Economides, Nicholas and Kwoka, John E. and Philippon, Thomas and Seamans, Robert and Singer, Hal J. and Steinbaum, Marshall and White, Lawrence J., Assessing DOJ’s Proposed Remedy in Sprint/T-Mobile: Can Ex Ante Competitive Conditions in Wireless Markets Be Restored? (October 10, 2019). NET Institute Working Paper No. 19-14, NYU Stern School of Business, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3467663 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3467663

Nicholas Economides (Contact Author)

New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

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John E. Kwoka

Northeastern University - Department of Economics ( email )

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Thomas Philippon

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance ( email )

Stern School of Business
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Robert Seamans

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )

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Hal J. Singer

Econ One ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://https://www.econone.com/staff-member/hal-singer/

Marshall Steinbaum

University of Utah Department of Economics ( email )

1645 Central Campus Dr.
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://faculty.utah.edu/u6024209-Marshall_Steinbaum/hm/index.hml

Lawrence J. White

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics ( email )

44 West 4th Street
Suite 9-160
New York, NY NY 10012
United States

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