Neutral Public Good Mechanisms

24 Pages Posted: 23 Oct 2019 Last revised: 18 Aug 2020

See all articles by Jin Yeub Kim

Jin Yeub Kim

Yonsei University - School of Economics

Date Written: October 14, 2019

Abstract

In this paper, I characterize neutral mechanisms for the provision of a public good. I show that neutral mechanisms form a reasonable set of predictions for mechanism selection in public goods problems; such predictions are sufficiently sharp, robust to a perturbation of the information structure at the time of selection, and invulnerable to the possibility of information leakage. I also illustrate that neutral mechanisms have the desirable properties of both efficiency and equity and can be conveniently computed by the tractable set of conditions. These results are shown to have interesting implications for the analysis of ex ante and interim incentive efficient mechanisms for public goods problems.

Keywords: Public goods, Mechanism design, Neutral optimum, Interim efficiency, Ex ante efficiency, Almost ex ante stage

JEL Classification: C71, C78, D74, D82, H41

Suggested Citation

Kim, Jin Yeub, Neutral Public Good Mechanisms (October 14, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3469422 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3469422

Jin Yeub Kim (Contact Author)

Yonsei University - School of Economics ( email )

Seoul
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

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