The Governance of Non-Profits and their Social Impact: Evidence from a Randomized Program in Healthcare in the Democratic Republic of Congo

79 Pages Posted: 23 Oct 2019 Last revised: 15 Aug 2022

See all articles by Anicet Fangwa

Anicet Fangwa

HEC PARIS

Caroline Flammer

Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Marieke Huysentruyt

HEC Paris

Bertrand V. Quelin

HEC Paris

Date Written: August 14, 2022

Abstract

How can non-profit organizations improve their governance to increase their social impact? This study examines the effectiveness of a bundle of governance mechanisms -- consisting of social performance-based incentives combined with auditing and feedback -- in the context of a randomized governance program conducted in the Democratic Republic of Congo's healthcare sector. Within the program, a set of health centers were randomly assigned to a governance treatment while others were not. We find that the governance treatment leads to i) higher operating efficiency and ii) improvements in health outcomes (measured by a reduction in stillbirths and neonatal deaths). Furthermore, we find that funding is not a substitute for governance -- health centers that only receive funding increase their scale, but do not show improvements in operating efficiency nor health outcomes. Overall, our results suggest that governance plays an important role in achieving the non-profits' objectives and increasing the social impact of the funds invested.

Keywords: non-profit governance, non-profit organizations, social impact, healthcare, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), developing countries, randomized experiment

JEL Classification: O, Q01, A1, D1, D2, D6, D8, F63, G3, I1

Suggested Citation

Fangwa, Anicet and Flammer, Caroline and Huysentruyt, Marieke and Quélin, Bertrand V., The Governance of Non-Profits and their Social Impact: Evidence from a Randomized Program in Healthcare in the Democratic Republic of Congo (August 14, 2022). HEC Paris Research Paper No. SPE-2019-1354, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3469543 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3469543

Anicet Fangwa

HEC PARIS ( email )

1 rue de la Liberation
Jouy-en-Josas Cedex
France

Caroline Flammer (Contact Author)

Columbia University ( email )

420 West 118th Street
Office 1429
New York, NY NY 10027
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.columbia.edu/~cf2870/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Marieke Huysentruyt

HEC Paris ( email )

1 rue de la Liberation
Jouy-en-Josas Cedex, 78351
France

Bertrand V. Quélin

HEC Paris ( email )

Jouy-en-Josas Cedex, 78351
France

HOME PAGE: http://www.hec.fr/quelin

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