Climate Regulation and Emissions Abatement: Theory and Evidence from Firms’ Disclosures

72 Pages Posted: 24 Oct 2019 Last revised: 2 Jul 2020

See all articles by Tarun Ramadorai

Tarun Ramadorai

Imperial College London; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Federica Zeni

Imperial College London; Bank of Italy

Date Written: July 1, 2020

Abstract

We construct measures of firms’ beliefs about climate regulation, plans for future abatement, and current actions on emissions mitigation, using Carbon Disclosure Project data. These measures vary significantly around the Paris climate change agreement announcement. A dynamic model of a representative firm exposed to a future carbon levy, trading-off emissions reduction against capital growth, and facing convex emissions abatement adjustment costs cannot explain these patterns. A two-firm model with cross-firm information asymmetry and reputational externalities does far better. Our findings imply that abatement is strongly affected by firms’ beliefs about climate regulation, with cross-firm interactions amplifying the effectiveness of regulation.

Keywords: climate change, climate regulation, carbon emissions, dynamic models, information asymmetry, reputation, abatement

JEL Classification: G31, G38, Q52, Q54

Suggested Citation

Ramadorai, Tarun and Zeni, Federica, Climate Regulation and Emissions Abatement: Theory and Evidence from Firms’ Disclosures (July 1, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3469787 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3469787

Tarun Ramadorai (Contact Author)

Imperial College London ( email )

South Kensington Campus
Exhibition Road
London, Greater London SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.tarunramadorai.com

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Federica Zeni

Imperial College London ( email )

South Kensington Campus
Exhibition Road
London, Greater London SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom

Bank of Italy ( email )

Via Nazionale 91
Rome, 00184
Italy

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