Climate Regulation and Emissions Abatement: Theory and Evidence from Firms’ Disclosures

60 Pages Posted: 24 Oct 2019

See all articles by Tarun Ramadorai

Tarun Ramadorai

Imperial College London; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Federica Zeni

Imperial College London; Bank of Italy

Date Written: October 14, 2019

Abstract

We use data from the Carbon Disclosure project (CDP) to measure firms’ beliefs about climate regulation, their plans for future abatement, and their current actions on mitigating carbon emissions. These measures vary both across firms and time in a manner that is especially pronounced around the Paris climate change agremeent announcement. A simple dynamic model of carbon abatement with a firm exposed to a certain future carbon levy, facing a trade-off between emissions reduction and capital growth, and convex emissions abatement adjustment costs cannot explain the data. A more complex two-firm dynamic model with both information asymmetry across firms and reputational concerns fits the data far better. Our findings imply that firms’ abatement actions depend greatly on their beliefs about climate regulation, and that both informational frictions and reputational concerns can amplify responses to climate regulation, increasing its effectiveness.

Keywords: climate change, climate regulation, carbon emissions, dynamic models, information asymmetry, reputation, abatement

JEL Classification: G31, G38, Q52, Q54

Suggested Citation

Ramadorai, Tarun and Zeni, Federica, Climate Regulation and Emissions Abatement: Theory and Evidence from Firms’ Disclosures (October 14, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3469787 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3469787

Tarun Ramadorai (Contact Author)

Imperial College London ( email )

South Kensington Campus
Exhibition Road
London, Greater London SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.tarunramadorai.com

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Federica Zeni

Imperial College London ( email )

South Kensington Campus
Exhibition Road
London, Greater London SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom

Bank of Italy ( email )

Via Nazionale 91
Rome, 00184
Italy

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