Economic Rents Derived from Hospital Privileges in the Market for Podiatric Services

32 Pages Posted: 4 Jan 2007 Last revised: 19 Jul 2010

See all articles by Richard G. Frank

Richard G. Frank

Harvard Medical School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Jonathan Weiner

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Donald M. Steinwachs

Johns Hopkins University - Department of Health Policy and Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

David S. Salkever

UMBC, Department of Public Policy

Date Written: April 1987

Abstract

This study examines the relative impacts of human capital and market conditions on the economic rents associated with hospital privileges in the market for footcare. An empirical model of hospital privileges for podiatrists is formulated based on the Pauly-Redisch model of hospital behavior. The privilege model is then incorporated into a model of podiatrists' earnings via a selection adjustment as proposed by Heckman and Lee. The results indicate the persistence of economic rents even after controlling for unobserved "quality" factors.

Suggested Citation

Frank, Richard G. and Weiner, Jonathan and Steinwachs, Donald M. and Salkever, David S., Economic Rents Derived from Hospital Privileges in the Market for Podiatric Services (April 1987). NBER Working Paper No. w2207. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=347002

Richard G. Frank (Contact Author)

Harvard Medical School ( email )

Department of Health Care Policy
Boston, MA 02115
United States
617-432-0178 (Phone)
617-432-1219 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Jonathan Weiner

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Donald M. Steinwachs

Johns Hopkins University - Department of Health Policy and Management

624 North Broadway
Baltimore, MD 21205

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

David S. Salkever

UMBC, Department of Public Policy ( email )

1000 Hilltop Circle
Baltimore, MD 21250

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