Procuring Medical Devices: Evidence from Italian Public Tenders

20 Pages Posted: 17 Oct 2019

See all articles by Vincenzo Atella

Vincenzo Atella

University of Rome Tor Vergata - Centre for International Studies on Economic Growth (CEIS); Department of Economics and Finance; University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics

Francesco Decarolis

Bocconi University - Department of Economics

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Date Written: October 2019

Abstract

The public procurement of medical devices is increasingly relying on auction mechanisms to move toward more transparent procedures and to promote competition between suppliers in a market where the quality of the products matters enormously and an improper auction design could be very harmful. Based on Italian hospital data, we present new evidence on the performance of the public tenders to procure orthopaedic prosthesis for hips, knees and shoulders. Focusing on three main outcomes, the number of participants, the presence of a single firm bidding and the winning rebate, for the first time we describe how features related to the tender, hospital, region and bidders' competition all contribute to explain the functioning of the procurement auctions. The evidence we obtain can meaningfully help policy makers in designing and implementing better public procurement systems.

Keywords: Italy, medical devices, orthopaedic prosthesis, Procurement auctions, tender characteristics

JEL Classification: C21, I18, J18

Suggested Citation

Atella, Vincenzo and Decarolis, Francesco, Procuring Medical Devices: Evidence from Italian Public Tenders (October 2019). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14044. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3471238

Vincenzo Atella (Contact Author)

University of Rome Tor Vergata - Centre for International Studies on Economic Growth (CEIS) ( email )

Via Columbia, 2
Rome, I-00133
Italy
+39 06 72595648 (Phone)

Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

Via Columbia 2
Roma, 00133
Italy

University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Via Columbia n.2
I-00133 Rome, 00133
Italy
+39 06 72595635 (Phone)
+30 06 2020 500 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.economia.uniroma2.it/sefemeq/professori/atella/

Francesco Decarolis

Bocconi University - Department of Economics ( email )

Via Gobbi 5
Milan, 20136
Italy

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