Maximal Domains for the Existence of Strategy-Proof Rules

Posted: 6 Nov 1996

See all articles by Stephen Ching

Stephen Ching

School of Economics and Finance, The University of Hong Kong

Shigehiro Serizawa

Tohoku University; University of Shiga

Abstract

Please send paper request to MAILTO:efgo@city.edu.hk In a recent paper, Sprumont (1991) showed that the uniform rule (Benassy, 1982) on the single-peaked domain (Black, 1948) is the only rule that satisfies strategy-proofness, anonymity, and efficiency. This result motivates us to investigate whether there is a larger domain on which there exists a nontrivial strategy-proof rule. Of course, we want such a domain to be as large as possible. We show that the single- plateaued domain (Moulin, 1984) is the unique maximal domain including single-peaked preferences for strategy-proofness, symmetry, and efficiency. Thus, we conclude that the assumption of single-peakedness essentially cannot be weakened if one insists on strategy-proofness, together with the distributional requirement of symmetry and the optimality requirement of efficiency.

JEL Classification: D7, D8

Suggested Citation

Ching, Stephen and Serizawa, Shigehiro, Maximal Domains for the Existence of Strategy-Proof Rules. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3475

Stephen Ching (Contact Author)

School of Economics and Finance, The University of Hong Kong ( email )

Pokfulam Road
Hong Kong

Shigehiro Serizawa

Tohoku University ( email )

SKK Building, Katahira 2
Graduate School of Economics
Aoba-ku, Sendai, 980-8577
Japan

University of Shiga

Hikone, Shiga, 522-8522
Japan

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