Board gender-balancing, network information, and insider trading
Tuck School of Business Working Paper No. 3475061
Proceedings of Paris December 2020 Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI - ESSEC
European Corporate Governance Institute – Finance Working Paper No. 783/2021
71 Pages Posted: 25 Oct 2019 Last revised: 24 Nov 2021
Date Written: November 12, 2021
Abstract
Following Norway's forced board gender-balancing (12/2007), which more than doubled the network of female directors, the short-term market reaction to the population of primary female insider purchases has become significantly positive. However, accounting for insiders' actual holding periods, this positive network-driven information effect does not map into positive abnormal insider trading performance. During the financial crisis period (10/2008 - 12/2010), both male and female insiders of the by then gender-balanced boards significantly increased their stock purchases. This increase, which we show does not reflect inside information, suggests that female directors are not more risk averse than their male counterparts.
Keywords: Board gender-balancing, director network, insider holdings, trading performance, risk aversion
JEL Classification: G14, M14
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation