Board gender-balancing and insider trading performance

63 Pages Posted: 25 Oct 2019 Last revised: 17 May 2023

See all articles by B. Espen Eckbo

B. Espen Eckbo

Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Bernt Arne Ødegaard

University of Stavanger

Date Written: May 16, 2023

Abstract

Using modern holdings-based performance measures, we test whether the dramatic female-director network expansion caused by Norway's board gender-balancing law has improved the information content and performance of trades by male versus female primary insiders. The potential for a network effect arises because industry peers share firm characteristics. We also examine gender-based insider purchase activity following the exogenous price-shocks during the financial crisis to draw inferences about potential differences in risk aversion. We identify a positive network-spurred information effect but no gender-based difference in either holdings-based performance or crisis-induced purchase activity.

Keywords: Board gender-balancing, director network, insider holdings, trading performance, risk aversion

JEL Classification: G14, M14

Suggested Citation

Eckbo, B. Espen and Ødegaard, Bernt Arne, Board gender-balancing and insider trading performance (May 16, 2023). Tuck School of Business Working Paper No. 3475061, European Corporate Governance Institute – Finance Working Paper No. 783/2021, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3475061 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3475061

B. Espen Eckbo (Contact Author)

Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth ( email )

Hanover, NH 03755
United States
603-646-3953 (Phone)
603-646-3805 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://tuck.dartmouth.edu/faculty/faculty-directory/b-espen-eckbo

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Bernt Arne Ødegaard

University of Stavanger ( email )

UiS Business School
Stavanger, NO-4036
Norway

HOME PAGE: http://ba-odegaard.no

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