Rules and Commitment in Communication: An Experimental Analysis

68 Pages Posted: 4 Nov 2019 Last revised: 16 Jun 2020

See all articles by Guillaume R. Frechette

Guillaume R. Frechette

New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics

Alessandro Lizzeri

Princeton University - Department of Economics

Jacopo Perego

Columbia University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 24, 2019

Abstract

We investigate models of cheap talk, information disclosure, and Bayesian persuasion, in a unified experimental framework. Our umbrella design permits the analysis of models that share the same structure regarding preferences and information, but differ in two dimensions: the rules governing communication, which determine whether information is verifiable; and the sender’s commitment power, which determines the extent to which she can commit to her communication strategy. Commitment is predicted to have contrasting effects on information transmission, depending on whether information is verifiable. Our design exploits these variations to explicitly test for the role of rules and commitment in communication. Our experiments provide general support for the strategic rationale behind the role of commitment and, more specifically, for the Bayesian persuasion model of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). At the same time, we document significant quantitative deviations. Most notably, we find that rules matter in ways that are entirely unpredicted by the theory, suggesting a novel policy role for information verifiability.

Keywords: Bayesian Persuasion, Disclosure, Cheap Talk, Commitment, Rules, Experiment

Suggested Citation

Frechette, Guillaume R. and Lizzeri, Alessandro and Perego, Jacopo, Rules and Commitment in Communication: An Experimental Analysis (October 24, 2019). NYU Stern School of Business, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3475075 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3475075

Guillaume R. Frechette (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics ( email )

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New York, NY 10012
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://files.nyu.edu/gf35/public/html/econ.htm

Alessandro Lizzeri

Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )

Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States
08544 (Fax)

Jacopo Perego

Columbia University ( email )

116th and Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

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