Leverage Intellectual Property: The Value of Harmonized Enforcement Regimes

66 Pages Posted: 29 Oct 2019 Last revised: 2 Nov 2022

See all articles by Andrej Gill

Andrej Gill

Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz

David Heller

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

Date Written: August 3, 2022

Abstract

We provide new evidence on how intellectual property (IP) rights support external debt financing
by investigating exogenous variation in patent right enforcement. Deploying a unique, large-scale
sample of European firms, we exploit the 2004 EU Enforcement Directive, a major legislative change
strengthening IP rights across Europe, as identifying event. Results show that firms with valuable
patent portfolios disproportionally increase debt financing by about 21%. Effects are particularly
pronounced for private SMEs, ex-ante financially constrained firms, and in competitive environments. Adding previously undisclosed patent collateral information provides suggestive evidence that enhanced IP enforcement benefits debt financing beyond a mere collateral channel.

Keywords: Intellectual property rights, debt financing, legal enforcement, financing constraints

JEL Classification: G30, G32, O32, O34

Suggested Citation

Gill, Andrej and Heller, David, Leverage Intellectual Property: The Value of Harmonized Enforcement Regimes (August 3, 2022). Leverage Intellectual Property: The Value of Harmonized Enforcement Regimes, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3475459 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3475459

Andrej Gill (Contact Author)

Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz ( email )

Saarstr. 21
Jakob Welder-Weg 4
Mainz, 55122
Germany

David Heller

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, Bayern 80539
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.david-heller.com

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