Risk Management using Cyber-Threat Information Sharing and Cyber-Insurance

7th EAI International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, May 9 , 2017

University of Illinois College of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Forthcoming

10 Pages Posted: 28 Oct 2019

See all articles by Deepak K. Tosh

Deepak K. Tosh

Norfolk State Universtiy

Sachin Shetty

Old Dominion University

Shamik Sengupta

University of Nevada, Reno

Jay P. Kesan

University of Illinois College of Law

Charles Kamhoua

Independent

Date Written: May 9, 2017

Abstract

Critical infrastructure systems spanning from transportation to nuclear operations are vulnerable to cyber attacks. Cyber-insurance and cyber-threat information sharing are two prominent mechanisms to defend cybersecurity issues proactively. However, standardization and realization of these choices have many bottlenecks. In this paper, we discuss the benefits and importance of cybersecurity information sharing and cyber-insurance in the current cyber-warfare situation. We model a standard game theoretic participation model for cybersecurity information exchange (CYBEX) and discuss the applicability of economic tools in addressing important issues related to CYBEX and cyber-insurance. We also pose several open research challenges, which need to be addressed for developing a robust cyber-risk management capability.

Suggested Citation

Tosh, Deepak K. and Shetty, Sachin and Sengupta, Shamik and Kesan, Jay P. and Kamhoua, Charles, Risk Management using Cyber-Threat Information Sharing and Cyber-Insurance (May 9, 2017). 7th EAI International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, May 9 , 2017, University of Illinois College of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3475640 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3475640

Deepak K. Tosh

Norfolk State Universtiy ( email )

Norfolk, VA 23504
United States

Sachin Shetty

Old Dominion University ( email )

1030 University Blvd
Suffolk, VA 23435
United States

Shamik Sengupta

University of Nevada, Reno ( email )

1664 N. Virginia St
Reno, NV 89557
United States

Jay P. Kesan (Contact Author)

University of Illinois College of Law ( email )

504 E. Pennsylvania Avenue
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
217-333-7887 (Phone)
217-244-1478 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.jaykesan.com

Charles Kamhoua

Independent ( email )

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