Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem and Asymmetric FPA Auctions

25 Pages Posted: 5 Nov 2019

See all articles by Dushko Josheski

Dushko Josheski

University Goce Delcev

Marina Blazekovic Toshevski

1University St. Kliment Ohridski, Bitola, Republic of Macedonia

Marija Magdinceva-Shopova

University Goce Delcev

Date Written: October 25, 2019

Abstract

In this paper Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem with asymmetric First price auction (FPA) has been subject of investigation. Bilateral inefficiency trade theorem versus the efficiency of the FPA auctions in which there is supposedly no dominant strategy, where bids are private information, and are made simultaneously, where highest bid wins and winning bidder pays the winning bid. This type of auction may not be Pareto efficient (this condition requires that the item is allocated to the bidder with highest valuation). But in the sealed FPA auctions highest bidder does not know other bidders’ valuations and may lose to another bidder. In the auction setting we set reserve price that causes efficiency loss and decreases probability of trade. The results are ambiguous dependent on the type of the solution method used. Three methods of solution were used: Fixed point finite difference iterations, Backward shooting method, and Constrained strategic equilibrium (C.S.E). The reserve price set was 0.5 since θ_s∈(0,1)and θ_b∈(0,1), so the buyers’ value is likely to be [0.1,1] and the sellers’ value is likely to be [0,0.9],so in such case reserve price would eliminate low bidder types. The results are ambiguous in a sense that under Backward shooting method convergence is not true, so the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem does hold which is not case under Fixed finite difference point iterations, and Constrained strategic equilibrium (C.S.E).Phenomenon known as winner’s curse occurs in a case of incomplete information.

Keywords: FPA, asymmetric auctions, C.S.E, Backward shooting method, Fixed point finite difference iterations, winner’s curse

JEL Classification: D44

Suggested Citation

Josheski, Dushko and Blazekovic Toshevski, Marina and Magdinceva-Shopova, Marija, Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem and Asymmetric FPA Auctions (October 25, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3475679 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3475679

Dushko Josheski (Contact Author)

University Goce Delcev ( email )

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Marina Blazekovic Toshevski

1University St. Kliment Ohridski, Bitola, Republic of Macedonia ( email )

Marija Magdinceva-Shopova

University Goce Delcev ( email )

PO box 201
Stip, 2000
Macedonia

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