Does Increased Teacher Accountability Decrease Leniency in Grading?

24 Pages Posted: 28 Oct 2019 Last revised: 16 Apr 2023

See all articles by Patrick A. Puhani

Patrick A. Puhani

Leibniz Universität Hannover; University of St. Gallen - Swiss Institute for International Economics and Applied Economic Research; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Université Paris II - Panthéon-Assas

Philip Yang

University of Tuebingen

Abstract

Because accountability may improve the comparability that is compromised by lenient grading, we compare exit exam outcomes in the same schools before and after a policy change that increased teacher accountability by anchoring grading scales. In particular, using a large administrative dataset of 364,445 exit exam outcomes for 72,889 students, we assess the effect of introducing centralized scoring standards into schools with higher and lower quality peer groups. We find that implementation of these standards increases scoring differences between the two school types by about 25 percent.

Keywords: rating standards, subjective performance evaluation, policy reform, transparency

JEL Classification: H83, I20, I28

Suggested Citation

Puhani, Patrick A. and Yang, Philip, Does Increased Teacher Accountability Decrease Leniency in Grading?. IZA Discussion Paper No. 12684, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3475790 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3475790

Patrick A. Puhani (Contact Author)

Leibniz Universität Hannover ( email )

Institut für Arbeitsökonomik
Koenigsworther Platz 1
30167 Hannover, DE 30167
Germany

University of St. Gallen - Swiss Institute for International Economics and Applied Economic Research ( email )

Dufourstr. 48
St. Gallen, 9000
Switzerland
+41 71 224 2341 (Phone)
+41 71 224 2298 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Université Paris II - Panthéon-Assas

12 place du Pantheon
Paris cedex 06, 75231
France

Philip Yang

University of Tuebingen ( email )

Wilhelmstr. 19
72074 Tuebingen, Baden Wuerttemberg 72074
Germany

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