Privacy & Market Concentration: Intended & Unintended Consequences of the GDPR

26 Pages Posted: 15 Nov 2019

See all articles by Garrett Johnson

Garrett Johnson

Questrom School of Business

Scott Shriver

University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Marketing

Date Written: November 6, 2019

Abstract

We show that the Europe Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) reduced data sharing online, but had the unintended consequence of increasing market concentration. We collect panel data on the web technology vendors selected by more than 27,000 top websites internationally. The week after the GDPR's enforcement, website use of web technology vendors falls by 15%. Websites are more likely to drop smaller vendors, which increases the relative concentration of the vendor market by 17%. Increased concentration predominantly arises from vendors that use personal data such as cookies, and from the increased relative shares of Facebook and Google-owned vendors, but not from user consent requests.

Keywords: Privacy, GDPR, Competition, Web technology

JEL Classification: D04, K21, L11, L22, L51, L86, M30, M38, O38

Suggested Citation

Johnson, Garrett and Shriver, Scott, Privacy & Market Concentration: Intended & Unintended Consequences of the GDPR (November 6, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3477686 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3477686

Garrett Johnson (Contact Author)

Questrom School of Business ( email )

595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
6173534677 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.bu.edu/questrom/faculty-research/faculty-directory/garrett-johnson/

Scott Shriver

University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Marketing ( email )

995 Regent Dr
Boulder, CO 80309
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.colorado.edu/business/scott-shriver

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