Distance and FDI When Contracts are Incomplete

Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano Development Studies Working Paper No. 165

26 Pages Posted: 14 Feb 2003

See all articles by Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano

Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano

Bocconi University - Department of Economics and Paolo Baffi Centre on Central Banking and Financial Regulation

Alessandro Turrini

European Commission; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 2002

Abstract

We introduce incomplete outsourcing contracts in an otherwise standard model of MNEs based on the trade-off between proximity and concentration. This has both positive and normative implications. As to the former, incomplete outsourcing contracts can account for the observed emergence of FDIs in large markets not only when trade costs are large but also when trade costs are small. As to the latter implications, contractual incompleteness alters someway dramatically the choice of supply mode made when contracts are complete.

Keywords: foreign direct investment, international trade costs, incomplete contracts

JEL Classification: F23

Suggested Citation

Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P. and Turrini, Alessandro, Distance and FDI When Contracts are Incomplete (November 2002). Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano Development Studies Working Paper No. 165, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=347881 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.347881

Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano

Bocconi University - Department of Economics and Paolo Baffi Centre on Central Banking and Financial Regulation ( email )

Via Gobbi 5
Milan, 20136
Italy

Alessandro Turrini (Contact Author)

European Commission ( email )

Office BU-10/113
B-1049 Brussels
Belgium
+32 2 299 5072 (Phone)
+32 2 299 3505 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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