Adverse Selection in the Annuity Market with Sequential and Simultaneous Insurance Demand
39 Pages Posted: 11 Nov 2002
Date Written: October 2002
Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of adverse selection on the private annuity market in a model with two periods of retirement. In order to introduce the existence of limited-time pension insurance, we assume that for each period of retirement separate contracts can be purchased. Demand for the two periods can be decided either sequentially or simultaneously. We show that different risk-groups prefer different types of contracts, and that only the sequential contracts, which are favourable for the long-living individuals, represent an equilibrium. Lifetimes, Equilibrium
Keywords: Annuity Markets, Adverse Selection, Uncertain
JEL Classification: D82, D91, G22
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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