From Coercion to Cooperation: Settlement within EU Competition Law

Global Centre for Competition Law Annual Conference in January 2019

LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 14/2019

35 Pages Posted: 13 Dec 2019

See all articles by Niamh Dunne

Niamh Dunne

London School of Economics - Law Department

Date Written: November 5, 2019

Abstract

This paper explores the proliferation of settlement mechanisms within contemporary antitrust enforcement pursued by the European Commission under Regulation 1/2003. To do so, it develops a taxonomy of settlement devices deployed in recent enforcement activity, considering for each the level of cooperation required, alongside what is at stake for defendants and the Commission in terms of the outcome of the administrative process. The chapter then addresses both the underlying motivations, and the broader implications in terms of law and practice, of the shift from coercion to cooperation as the default model of competition enforcement in the EU.

Keywords: settlement, antitrust, EU, competition law

Suggested Citation

Dunne, Niamh, From Coercion to Cooperation: Settlement within EU Competition Law (November 5, 2019). Global Centre for Competition Law Annual Conference in January 2019; LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 14/2019. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3481419 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3481419

Niamh Dunne (Contact Author)

London School of Economics - Law Department ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

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