Common Ownership Theories, Governance ‘Mechanisms’ & Policy (Presentation Slides)

30 Pages Posted: 2 Dec 2019

See all articles by Martin C. Schmalz

Martin C. Schmalz

CEPR; University of Oxford - Finance; CESifo; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: December 6, 2018


These slides summarize the theoretical literature on horizontal common ownership concentration and its impact on competition, as presented at the FTC's hearings on common ownership and competition in December 2018. They are primarily based on this literature review:

Keywords: ownership, control, network, industry concentration, antitrust, objective of the firm, shareholder unanimity

JEL Classification: D21, D22, G10, G30, G32, G34, J41, K21, L10, L16, L21, L40, L41, L42

Suggested Citation

Schmalz, Martin C. and Schmalz, Martin C., Common Ownership Theories, Governance ‘Mechanisms’ & Policy (Presentation Slides) (December 6, 2018). Available at SSRN: or

Martin C. Schmalz (Contact Author)

CEPR ( email )

United Kingdom

University of Oxford - Finance ( email )

United States

CESifo ( email )

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Munich, DE-81679

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

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1000 Brussels

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