Common Ownership Theories, Governance ‘Mechanisms’ & Policy (Presentation Slides)

30 Pages Posted: 2 Dec 2019

See all articles by Martin C. Schmalz

Martin C. Schmalz

University of Oxford - Finance; CEPR; CESifo; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: December 6, 2018

Abstract

These slides summarize the theoretical literature on horizontal common ownership concentration and its impact on competition, as presented at the FTC's hearings on common ownership and competition in December 2018. They are primarily based on this literature review: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3046829

Keywords: ownership, control, network, industry concentration, antitrust, objective of the firm, shareholder unanimity

JEL Classification: D21, D22, G10, G30, G32, G34, J41, K21, L10, L16, L21, L40, L41, L42

Suggested Citation

Schmalz, Martin C., Common Ownership Theories, Governance ‘Mechanisms’ & Policy (Presentation Slides) (December 6, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3483849

Martin C. Schmalz (Contact Author)

University of Oxford - Finance ( email )

United States

CEPR ( email )

London
United Kingdom

CESifo ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

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