Rookie Directors and Firm Performance: Evidence From China
67 Pages Posted: 24 Nov 2019
Date Written: November 1, 2019
This paper examines the benefits and costs associated with rookie independent directors (RIDs) in Chinese public companies from 2008 to 2014. We find that RIDs attend more board meetings. Boards with more RIDs tunnel less to controlling shareholders, suggesting that RIDs are efficient monitors. However, in state-owned firms, the presence of RIDs is negatively associated with investment efficiency, suggesting a potential cost of appointing RIDs. Overall, firms with more RIDs have higher operating performance, especially when tunneling is a more common issue, when board experience is less important and when monitoring costs are relatively low.
Keywords: Rookie Directors, Firm Performance, China, Meeting Attendance, Tunneling
JEL Classification: G32, G34
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