Delegation and Devolution After Brexit: A Revised Theory of Intergovernmental Policymaking

21 Pages Posted: 20 Nov 2019

See all articles by Anthony M. Bertelli

Anthony M. Bertelli

Bocconi University - DONDENA - Carlo F. Dondena Centre for Research on Social Dynamics; Pennsylvania State University

Giulia Leila Travaglini

Bocconi University

Nicola Palma

University of Bologna - Department of Political and Social Sciences

Date Written: November 10, 2019

Abstract

British institutions allow the central government to make the key choices regarding the devolution of EU powers, but what incentives does it face when choosing whether to centralize or devolve authority post-Brexit? We offer a formal theory of the delegation and devolution of powers under both "hard" and "soft" Brexit scenarios that produces four main findings. First, when structural independence is less effective in reducing policy drift and incentivizing expertise for both European and territorial agents, hard Brexit yields more devolved policy-making. Second, however, the extent to which structural independence decreases policy drift and capacity acquisition does not influence the devolution choice of the central government. Third, if Westminster does not see a clear difference in the effect of independence on drift or expertise in the European or regional agencies, territorial agencies will enjoy at least as much independence as they did pre-Brexit. Fourth, a soft Brexit will lead to a decrease in devolution and structural independence compared with pre-Brexit levels. We also argue that technical policies will experience more devolved authority, while ideological policies will be more centralized.

Keywords: Delegation, Devolution, Brexit, Public Administration, Public Policy, European Union, Intergovernmental Relations

JEL Classification: D73, D78

Suggested Citation

Bertelli, Anthony M. and Travaglini, Giulia Leila and Palma, Nicola, Delegation and Devolution After Brexit: A Revised Theory of Intergovernmental Policymaking (November 10, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3484512 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3484512

Anthony M. Bertelli (Contact Author)

Bocconi University - DONDENA - Carlo F. Dondena Centre for Research on Social Dynamics ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy

Pennsylvania State University ( email )

University Park, PA 16802-3306
United States

HOME PAGE: http://tonybertelli.com

Giulia Leila Travaglini

Bocconi University ( email )

Via Sarfatti, 25
Milan, MI 20136
Italy

Nicola Palma

University of Bologna - Department of Political and Social Sciences ( email )

Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, Bologna 40125
Italy

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
34
Abstract Views
335
PlumX Metrics