Dueling contests and platform's coordinating role

University of California, San Diego, Rady School of Management Working Paper No 3485193

Darden Business School Working Paper No. 3485193

55 Pages Posted: 15 Nov 2019 Last revised: 3 Dec 2021

See all articles by Konstantinos I. Stouras

Konstantinos I. Stouras

UCD, Michael Smurfit Graduate Business School

Sanjiv Erat

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management

Kenneth C. Lichtendahl

University of Virginia - Darden School of Business

Date Written: November 11, 2017

Abstract

Crowdsourcing platforms typically take a passive approach and let competing firms freely design their contest and allow solvers self-select to compete in any of the concurrently running contests. We characterize the between-firm equilibrium in prize allocations and the induced participation-effort equilibrium among solvers. We find that the self-sorting equilibrium hurts the solvers and the total welfare. Thus, platform policies to coordinate the firms (for example by requiring that the firms choose among a few available budget choices so that contests appear ex-ante similarly attractive to solvers), or policies to coordinate the solvers by recommending and nudging each solver toward a specific contest improve overall welfare.

Keywords: crowdsourcing; nudges; incentives; multiple contests; endogenous participation

Suggested Citation

Stouras, Konstantinos I. and Erat, Sanjiv and Lichtendahl, Kenneth C., Dueling contests and platform's coordinating role (November 11, 2017). University of California, San Diego, Rady School of Management Working Paper No 3485193, Darden Business School Working Paper No. 3485193, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3485193 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3485193

Konstantinos I. Stouras (Contact Author)

UCD, Michael Smurfit Graduate Business School ( email )

Carysfort Ave
Blackrock
Ireland

Sanjiv Erat

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
Rady School of Management
La Jolla, CA 92093
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.rady.ucsd.edu/faculty/directory/erat/

Kenneth C. Lichtendahl

University of Virginia - Darden School of Business ( email )

P.O. Box 6550
Charlottesville, VA 22906-6550
United States

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