Bank Regulation and Supervision Ten Years after the Global Financial Crisis

63 Pages Posted: 15 Nov 2019 Last revised: 26 Feb 2020

See all articles by Deniz Anginer

Deniz Anginer

Simon Fraser University (SFU)

Ata Can Bertay

Sabancı University; Tilburg University - European Banking Center

Robert Cull

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Asli Demirgüç-Kunt

World Bank

Davide Salvatore Mare

University of Edinburgh - Business School; World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Date Written: October 15, 2019

Abstract

This paper summarizes the latest update of the World Bank Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey. The paper explores and summarizes the evolution in bank capital regulations, capitalization of banks, market discipline, and supervisory power since the global financial crisis. It shows that regulatory capital increased, but some elements of capital regulations became laxer. Market discipline may have deteriorated as the financial safety nets became more generous after the crisis. Bank supervision became stricter and more complex compared with the pre?global financial crisis period. However, supervisory capacity did not increase in proportion to the extent and complexity of new bank regulations. The paper documents the importance of defining bank regulatory capital narrowly, as the quality of capital matters in reducing bank risk. This is particularly true for large banks, because they have more discretion in the computation of risk weights and are better able to issue a variety of capital instruments.

Suggested Citation

Anginer, Deniz and Bertay, Ata Can and Cull, Robert and Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli and Mare, Davide Salvatore and Mare, Davide Salvatore, Bank Regulation and Supervision Ten Years after the Global Financial Crisis (October 15, 2019). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 9044, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3485929

Deniz Anginer (Contact Author)

Simon Fraser University (SFU) ( email )

8888 University Drive
Burnaby, British Columbia V5A 1S6
Canada

Ata Can Bertay

Sabancı University ( email )

Orhanli
Istanbul, Tuzla 34956
Turkey

HOME PAGE: http://www.atabertay.com

Tilburg University - European Banking Center ( email )

PO Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Robert Cull

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) ( email )

1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States
202-473-6365 (Phone)
202-522-1155 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/rcull

Asli Demirgüç-Kunt

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Davide Salvatore Mare

University of Edinburgh - Business School ( email )

Edinburgh, Scotland
United Kingdom

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) ( email )

1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
82
Abstract Views
468
rank
384,439
PlumX Metrics