Weak Monotone Comparative Statics

63 Pages Posted: 12 Dec 2019

See all articles by Yeon-Koo Che

Yeon-Koo Che

Columbia University

Jinwoo Kim

Seoul National University

Fuhito Kojima

Stanford University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 14, 2019

Abstract

We develop a theory of monotone comparative statics based on weak set order, or in short weak monotone comparative statics, and identify the enabling conditions in the context of individual choices, Pareto optimal choices for a coalition of agents, and Nash equilibria of games. Compared with the existing theory based on strong set order, the conditions for weak monotone comparative statics are weaker, sometimes considerably, in terms of the structure of the choice environment and underlying preferences of agents. We apply the theory to establish existence and monotone comparative statics of Nash equilibria in games with strategic complementarities and of stable many-to-one matchings in two-sided matching problems, allowing for general preferences that accommodate indifferences and incomplete preferences.

Keywords: monotone comparative statics, weak set order, fixed-point theorem, games with strategic complementarities, stable two-sided many-to-one matchings

JEL Classification: C61, C72, D47

Suggested Citation

Che, Yeon-Koo and Kim, Jinwoo and Kojima, Fuhito, Weak Monotone Comparative Statics (November 14, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3486365 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3486365

Yeon-Koo Che

Columbia University ( email )

420 W. 118th Street
New York, NY 10027

Jinwoo Kim (Contact Author)

Seoul National University ( email )

1 Gwanak-ro
Gwanak-Gu
Seoul, 08826
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

Fuhito Kojima

Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
311
Abstract Views
3,199
rank
108,574
PlumX Metrics