Gradual College Admission
37 Pages Posted: 1 Dec 2019 Last revised: 16 Dec 2019
Date Written: October 25, 2019
We study multi-period college admission problems where, at each period, a matching is computed and students have option to either finalize their matches or participate to the next period. Students participating to an additional run of the matching mechanism can submit a new preference list to the matching clearinghouse. Such gradual matching systems can adequately account for an additional source of heterogeneity among participants, like scheduling constraints or withdrawals. We identify the conditions under which such systems first produce incentives to participate to additional runs of the matching mechanism and second yield to stable matchings (with a stability concept adapted to this environment). We use our results to evaluate the former French college admission system, where students could finalize their matches at different dates up to two months ahead the final date.
Keywords: gradual matching, withdrawal, French college admissions system
JEL Classification: C78
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation