Information Provision and Preferences for Education Spending: Evidence from Representative Survey Experiments in Three Countries

35 Pages Posted: 18 Nov 2019 Last revised: 5 May 2023

See all articles by Maria Alejandra Cattaneo

Maria Alejandra Cattaneo

Swiss Coordination Centre for Research in Education (SKBF)

Philipp Lergetporer

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute

Guido Schwerdt

University of Konstanz - Faculty of Economics and Statistics

Katharina Werner

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - ifo Center for the Economics of Education

Ludger Woessmann

Ifo Institute for Economic Research; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); University of Munich - Ifo Institute for Economic Research

Stefan C. Wolter

Swiss Coordination Centre for Research in Education (SKBF); University of Bern - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

Do differences in citizens' policy preferences hamper international cooperation in education policy? To gain comparative evidence on public preferences for education spending, we conduct representative experiments with information treatments in Switzerland using identical survey techniques previously used in Germany and the United States. In Switzerland, providing information about actual spending and salary levels reduces support for increased education spending from 54 to 40 percent and for increased teacher salaries from 27 to 19 percent, respectively. The broad patterns of education policy preferences are similar across the three countries when the role of status-quo and information are taken into account.

Keywords: education spending, United States, Germany, Switzerland, international cooperation, cross-country comparison, policy preferences, information, survey experiments

JEL Classification: H52, I22, D72, D83

Suggested Citation

Cattaneo, Maria Alejandra and Lergetporer, Philipp and Schwerdt, Guido and Werner, Katharina and Woessmann, Ludger and Wolter, Stefan C., Information Provision and Preferences for Education Spending: Evidence from Representative Survey Experiments in Three Countries. IZA Discussion Paper No. 12749, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3488176 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3488176

Maria Alejandra Cattaneo (Contact Author)

Swiss Coordination Centre for Research in Education (SKBF) ( email )

CH - 5000 Aarau
Switzerland

Philipp Lergetporer

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute ( email )

Dresden Branch
Einsteinstraße 3
Dresden, 01069
Germany

Guido Schwerdt

University of Konstanz - Faculty of Economics and Statistics ( email )

Universitaetsstr. 10
78457 Konstanz
Germany

Katharina Werner

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 01069
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - ifo Center for the Economics of Education ( email )

Munich
Germany

Ludger Woessmann

Ifo Institute for Economic Research ( email )

Poschingerstr. 5
Munich
Germany
++49 89 9224 1699 (Phone)
++49 89 9224 1460 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cesifo.de/link/woessmann_l.htm

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

University of Munich - Ifo Institute for Economic Research

Schackstr. 4
Munich, 80539
Germany

Stefan C. Wolter

Swiss Coordination Centre for Research in Education (SKBF) ( email )

CH - 5000 Aarau
Switzerland
+41 62 835 23 90 (Phone)
+41 62 835 23 99 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.skbf-csre.ch

University of Bern - Department of Economics ( email )

Gesellschaftstrasse 49
Bern, CH-3012
Switzerland
+41 31 631 40 95 (Phone)
+41 31 631 39 92 (Fax)

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