Localised Effects of Re-allocated Real Estate Mafia Assets

57 Pages Posted: 9 Dec 2019 Last revised: 24 Aug 2022

See all articles by Filippo Boeri

Filippo Boeri

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE); ESSEC Business School - Economics Department

Marco Di Cataldo

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Geography and Environment; Ca' Foscari University of Venice, Department of Economics

Elisabetta Pietrostefani

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE), Department of Geography and Environment; University College London - Institute for Global Prosperity

Date Written: November 17, 2019

Abstract

In an effort to tackle organised crime, the Italian State implements a policy stipulating that properties confiscated to individuals convicted of mafia-related crimes are re-allocated to a new use. The policy is meant to act as both an anti-mafia measure and a way to compensate local communities by converting real-estate assets into public amenities. We assess whether this scheme has an effect on the regeneration of local areas by assessing its impact on the value of properties in the vicinity of re-allocated assets and crime activity. The results unveil a positive effect of re-allocated real estate assets on house prices, driven by mafia strongholds, more deprived neighbourhoods, and areas with more inelastic housing supply. The findings suggest declining effects with distance from the re-allocation site, indicating that the policy impact is highly localised. Part of this effect appears due to a decrease in organised crime activity in the streets where re-allocations have taken place. These findings have implications for the effectiveness of policies aiming to improve the quality of neighbourhoods where mafia presence is more pronounced.

Keywords: Organised crime, confiscation, hedonic analysis, urban regeneration policy, Italy.

JEL Classification: K42, R32, H23

Suggested Citation

Boeri, Filippo and Di Cataldo, Marco and Pietrostefani, Elisabetta, Localised Effects of Re-allocated Real Estate Mafia Assets (November 17, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3488626 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3488626

Filippo Boeri

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/filippoboeri/home

ESSEC Business School - Economics Department ( email )

95021 Cergy-Pontoise Cedex
France

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/filippoboeri/home

Marco Di Cataldo (Contact Author)

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Geography and Environment ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

Ca' Foscari University of Venice, Department of Economics ( email )

Cannaregio 873
Venice, Veneto 30121
Italy

Elisabetta Pietrostefani

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE), Department of Geography and Environment ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

University College London - Institute for Global Prosperity ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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