CEO Connectedness and the Cost of Equity Capital

53 Pages Posted: 2 Dec 2019

See all articles by Min Suk Lee

Min Suk Lee

Nanjing Audit University - Institute of Economics and Finance

Angie Low

Nanyang Technological University - Division of Banking & Finance

Siew Hong Teoh

University of California, Irvine - Accounting Area

Date Written: November 17, 2019

Abstract

A larger CEO network can reduce the cost of equity by reducing information asymmetry between the firm and outsiders, and by increasing trust between the firm and stakeholders. Alternatively, a larger CEO network can increase the cost of equity because higher CEO connectedness encourages greater agency problems and more risk-taking by reducing the costs borne by the CEO from a termination. We find a positive relation between a CEO’s connectedness and the firm’s cost of equity, suggesting that, on average, the costs of CEO connectedness outweigh the benefits. The positive relation between a CEO’s connections and the firm’s cost of equity is attenuated for firms with high information asymmetry. This additional cross-sectional result is consistent with the higher benefits of improved information flow from connectedness in firms with high information asymmetry that can help mitigate some of the adverse effects of agency costs and risk-taking. We use multiple methods to address endogeneity and reverse causality problems, and our results remain generally robust.

Keywords: Social capital, social networks, cost of equity, implied cost of capital

JEL Classification: G30, M41, Z13

Suggested Citation

Lee, Min Suk and Low, Angie and Teoh, Siew Hong, CEO Connectedness and the Cost of Equity Capital (November 17, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3488660 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3488660

Min Suk Lee (Contact Author)

Nanjing Audit University - Institute of Economics and Finance ( email )

86 Yushan W Rd
Pukou, Jiangsu 210017
China

Angie Low

Nanyang Technological University - Division of Banking & Finance ( email )

Singapore, 639798
Singapore

Siew Hong Teoh

University of California, Irvine - Accounting Area ( email )

Irvine, CA 92697-3125
United States

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