Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=349021
 
 

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Feasible Globalizations


Dani Rodrik


Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

July 2002

KSG Working Paper Series RWP02-029

Abstract:     
The nation-state system, democratic politics, and full economic integration are mutually incompatible. Of the three, at most two can be had together. The Bretton Woods/GATT regime was successful because its architects subjugated international economic integration to the needs and demands of national economic management and democratic politics. A renewed "Bretton-Woods compromise" would preserve some limits on integration, while crafting better global rules to handle the integration that can be achieved. Among "feasible globalizations," the most promising is a multilaterally negotiated visa scheme that allows expanded (but temporary) entry into the advanced nations of a mix of skilled and unskilled workers from developing nations. Such a scheme would likely create income gains that are larger than all of the items on the WTO negotiating agenda taken together, even if it resulted in a relatively small increase in cross-border labor flows.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

Keywords: International Affairs, Globalization


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Date posted: December 23, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Rodrik, Dani, Feasible Globalizations (July 2002). KSG Working Paper Series RWP02-029. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=349021 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.349021

Contact Information

Dani Rodrik (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-9454 (Phone)
617-496-5747 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/rodrik/
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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