Factors Influencing CEO Compensation in US Telecommunication Industry

Journal of Economic and Financial Studies (2014), Vol. 2, Iss. 1, pp. 40-49.

14 Pages Posted: 5 Dec 2019

See all articles by Tatiana Garanina

Tatiana Garanina

University of Vaasa; Vaasan yliopisto (University of Vaasa); Saint Petersburg State University

Yulia Ladyzhenko

Saint Petersburg State University

Date Written: April 21, 2014

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to define the relationship between a set of factors and CEO compensation that will enable companies to imply better corporate governance practices in their management process. Developed econometric model is tested on the data of US telecom companies for the period 2004-2012. The study revealed that CEO compensation is strongly and positively related to revenue and earnings per share of the company, and unrelated to return on net assets and market value added. These results enable companies to use CEO compensation system as an effective mechanism to eliminate agency problem and, consequently, agency costs. The main directions for further research in this field are outlined.

Keywords: CEO compensation, Agency problem, Corporate governance, US telecommunication companies

JEL Classification: G32, G34, J33

Suggested Citation

Garanina, Tatiana and Garanina, Tatiana and Ladyzhenko, Yulia, Factors Influencing CEO Compensation in US Telecommunication Industry (April 21, 2014). Journal of Economic and Financial Studies (2014), Vol. 2, Iss. 1, pp. 40-49., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3490559

Tatiana Garanina (Contact Author)

University of Vaasa ( email )

P.O. Box 700
Wolffintie 34
Vaasa, FI-65101
Finland

Vaasan yliopisto (University of Vaasa) ( email )

P.O. Box 700
P.O. Box 700
Vaasa, FI-65101
Finland

Saint Petersburg State University ( email )

7-9, Universitetskaya nab.
Saint Petersburg, 199034
Russia

Yulia Ladyzhenko

Saint Petersburg State University ( email )

7-9, Universitetskaya nab.
Saint Petersburg, 199034
Russia

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