Utilitarianism and Horizontal Equity: The Case for Random Taxation

56 Pages Posted: 18 Aug 2004 Last revised: 26 Nov 2022

See all articles by Joseph E. Stiglitz

Joseph E. Stiglitz

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: June 1981

Abstract

This paper establishes that, far from being able to derive the principle of horizontal equity from utilitarianism, the principle is actually in- consistent with utilitarianism in a variety of circumstances. We derive conditions under which (a) it is optimal to impose random tax schedules (ex post randomization) ; and (b) it is optimal to randomize the tax schedules imposed on a set of otherwise identical individuals (ex ante randomization). The implications for optimal tax theory are discussed. More generally, it is shown that there are a number of potentially important economic situations with which the principle of horizontal equity may be inconsistent not only with utilitarianism but even with Pareto optimality.

Suggested Citation

Stiglitz, Joseph E., Utilitarianism and Horizontal Equity: The Case for Random Taxation (June 1981). NBER Working Paper No. w0694, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=349091

Joseph E. Stiglitz (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance ( email )

3022 Broadway
814 Uris Hall
New York, NY 10027
United States
(212) 854-0671 (Phone)
(212) 662-8474 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.josephstiglitz.com

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States