Buying Manipulation around Seasoned Equity Offerings

Abstract

We show that seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), in which secondary share-offering size greatly exceeds market share turnover, provide a unique opportunity for stock price manipulation by speculators holding restricted shares. The proposed new theory is consistent with several puzzling empirical findings, for example, the positive abnormal stock return between announcement and issuance and the long-term poorer returns of issuing firms after SEOs. The manipulation is characterized by a strong buying in the secondary market prior to the issuance, which drives up the market price and thereby the offering price of restricted shares, and a large amount of liquidation of restricted shares in the SEO. Our model predicts that favorable market reactions with speculator's manipulative intent after SEO announcement could occur, which naturally leads to a successful issuance and over-investment based long-term underperformance after SEO.

Keywords: Informed Speculator, Seasoned Equity Offerings, Market Feedback, Stock Price Manipulation, Project Financing, Market Microstructure

JEL Classification: G15, G32, G33, G38, K4