Contraction and Expansion: the Divergence of Private Sector and Public Sector Unionism in Tht U.S

50 Pages Posted: 24 Jan 2007 Last revised: 24 Jul 2022

See all articles by Richard B. Freeman

Richard B. Freeman

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); University of Edinburgh - School of Social and Political Studies; Harvard University; London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)

Date Written: October 1987

Abstract

This paper contrasts the differing experience of public sector unionism, which has expanded in the United States, and private sector unionism, which has contracted, in the past several decades. It uses the experience of other countries, particularly Canada, to rule out some explanations of the divergent trends. The paper finds that the major reason for the private sector decline is increased management opposition to union organization, motivated in part by profit-seeking behavior, and augmented by trade union responses; and that the major reason for the public sector union expansion is decreased market opposition due to pas- sage of comprehensive collective bargaining laws and motivated in part by vote-seeking behavior.

Suggested Citation

Freeman, Richard B., Contraction and Expansion: the Divergence of Private Sector and Public Sector Unionism in Tht U.S (October 1987). NBER Working Paper No. w2399, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=349213

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