A Theory of Falling Growth and Rising Rents

64 Pages Posted: 26 Nov 2019

See all articles by Philippe Aghion

Philippe Aghion

College de France and London School of Economics and Political Science, Fellow; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Antonin Bergeaud

HEC Paris - Economics & Decision Sciences

Timo Boppart

Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES); University of Zurich - Department of Economics

Peter J. Klenow

Stanford University

Huiyu Li

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 2019

Abstract

Growth has fallen in the U.S., while firm concentration and profits have risen. Meanwhile, labor’s share of national income is down, mostly due to the rising market share of low labor share firms. We propose a theory for these trends in which the driving force is falling firm-level costs of spanning multiple markets, perhaps due to accelerating IT advances. In response, the most efficient firms (with higher markups) spread into new markets, thereby generating a temporary burst of growth. Because their efficiency is difficult to imitate, less efficient firms find markets more difficult to enter profitably and therefore innovate less.

Eventually, due to greater competition from efficient firms, within-firm markups actually fall. Despite the increase in the aggregate markup and rents, firm incentives to innovate decline— lowering the long run growth rate.

Keywords: Labor Income Share, Concentration, Growth, Markups

JEL Classification: O31, O47, O51

Suggested Citation

Aghion, Philippe and Bergeaud, Antonin and Boppart, Timo and Klenow, Peter J. and Li, Huiyu, A Theory of Falling Growth and Rising Rents (November 2019). Banque de France Working Paper No. 740, November 2019, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3492939 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3492939

Philippe Aghion

College de France and London School of Economics and Political Science, Fellow ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Antonin Bergeaud (Contact Author)

HEC Paris - Economics & Decision Sciences ( email )

Paris
France

Timo Boppart

Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES) ( email )

Stockholm, SE-10691
Sweden

University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )

Zürich, CH-8006
Switzerland

Peter J. Klenow

Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

Huiyu Li

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco ( email )

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