Investigating the Failure to Best Respond in Experimental Games

34 Pages Posted: 13 Dec 2019 Last revised: 28 Nov 2020

See all articles by Despoina Alempaki

Despoina Alempaki

University of Warwick

Andrew Colman

University of Leicester

Felix Kölle

University of Cologne - Department of Economics

Graham Loomes

University of Warwick

Briony D. Pulford

University of Leicester

Date Written: November 27, 2020

Abstract

In experimental games, a substantial minority of players often fail to best respond. Using two-person 3x3 one-shot games, we investigate whether ‘structuring’ the pre-decision deliberation process produces greater consistency between individuals’ stated values and beliefs on the one hand and their choice of action on the other. Our results show that, despite this intervention, only just over half of strategy choices constitute best responses. Distinguishing between players according to their other-regarding preferences makes a statistically significant difference, but the increase in best responding is rather small in terms of size.

Keywords: game theory, best response, strategic thinking, social preferences, stated beliefs

JEL Classification: A13, C72, C91, C92, D84

Suggested Citation

Alempaki, Despoina and Colman, Andrew and Kölle, Felix and Loomes, Graham and Pulford, Briony D., Investigating the Failure to Best Respond in Experimental Games (November 27, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3493826 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3493826

Despoina Alempaki (Contact Author)

University of Warwick ( email )

Scarman Road
Coventry, CV4 7AL
United Kingdom

Andrew Colman

University of Leicester ( email )

University Road
Leicester, LE1 7RH
United Kingdom

Felix Kölle

University of Cologne - Department of Economics ( email )

Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Cologne, 50923
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://https://felixkoelle.weebly.com/

Graham Loomes

University of Warwick ( email )

Gibbet Hill Rd.
Coventry, West Midlands CV4 8UW
United Kingdom

Briony D. Pulford

University of Leicester ( email )

University Road
Leicester, LE1 7RH
United Kingdom
00441162297172 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.le.ac.uk/pc/bdp5/index.html

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