Head Starts in Dynamic Tournaments?

9 Pages Posted: 16 Dec 2019

See all articles by Philipp Denter

Philipp Denter

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

Dana Sisak

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics; Tinbergen Institute

Date Written: 2016

Abstract

In promotion contests or other tournament-like situations, a principal may attach some value to the highest effort expended by an agent. We show that whenever agents interact over multiple periods, awarding a head start to one of them is optimal even with completely symmetric agents. Awarding a small head start increases maximum individual effort without decreasing aggregate effort.

Keywords: Personnel Economics, Contests, Tournaments, Head Start

JEL Classification: D72, D82, L12

Suggested Citation

Denter, Philipp and Sisak, Dana, Head Starts in Dynamic Tournaments? (2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3495187 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3495187

Philipp Denter (Contact Author)

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid ( email )

CL. de Madrid 126
Madrid, Madrid 28903
Spain

Dana Sisak

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
4
Abstract Views
93
PlumX Metrics