Justified-Envy-Minimal Efficient Mechanisms for Priority-Based Matching

39 Pages Posted: 3 Dec 2019 Last revised: 18 May 2020

See all articles by Hyukjun Kwon

Hyukjun Kwon

Rutgers University, New Brunswick - Department of Economics

Ran I. Shorrer

Pennsylvania State University

Date Written: May 18, 2020

Abstract

We study priority-based matching markets with public and private endowments. We show that efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance (EADA) is justified-envy minimal in the class of efficient mechanisms, while Top trading cycles (TTC) and other popular mechanisms are not. Our findings highlight EADA as an interesting alternative to TTC in the context of transplantation-organ
markets. Restricting attention to strategyproof mechanisms, we show that TTC is justified-envy minimal, strengthening the result of Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2020).

Keywords: efficiency, justified-envy minimality, kidney exchange

JEL Classification: C78, D61, D63, I10

Suggested Citation

Kwon, Hyukjun and Shorrer, Ran I., Justified-Envy-Minimal Efficient Mechanisms for Priority-Based Matching (May 18, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3495266 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3495266

Hyukjun Kwon (Contact Author)

Rutgers University, New Brunswick - Department of Economics ( email )

New Brunswick, NJ
United States

Ran I. Shorrer

Pennsylvania State University ( email )

University Park
State College, PA 16802
United States

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