Justified-Envy-Minimal Efficient Mechanisms for Priority-Based Matching
39 Pages Posted: 3 Dec 2019 Last revised: 18 May 2020
Date Written: May 18, 2020
We study priority-based matching markets with public and private endowments. We show that efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance (EADA) is justified-envy minimal in the class of efficient mechanisms, while Top trading cycles (TTC) and other popular mechanisms are not. Our findings highlight EADA as an interesting alternative to TTC in the context of transplantation-organ
markets. Restricting attention to strategyproof mechanisms, we show that TTC is justified-envy minimal, strengthening the result of Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2020).
Keywords: efficiency, justified-envy minimality, kidney exchange
JEL Classification: C78, D61, D63, I10
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