Status and Reputation Nudging

24 Pages Posted: 19 Dec 2019

See all articles by Michael Kirchler

Michael Kirchler

University of Innsbruck

Julia Elisabeth Rose

Erasmus University; Tinbergen Institute

Stefan Palan

University of Graz

Date Written: December 2, 2019

Abstract

Status and reputation concerns are conjectured to be important especially in markets with information asymmetries between buyers and sellers, such as in credence goods markets. To investigate the effects of status and reputation on reciprocal behavior of sales personnel in a financial credence goods market, we run a natural field experiment. We send e-mail requests to insurance brokers asking for an appointment. We find that status nudging and, with a larger effect size, reputation nudging in the e-mails increase brokers’ response rates compared to a neutral request. Both effects are robust across all responses, only counting affirmative responses, and in urban and rural areas.

Keywords: insurance brokers, natural field experiment, credence goods, status, reputation

JEL Classification: C93, G41, G22, D12

Suggested Citation

Kirchler, Michael and Rose, Julia Elisabeth and Palan, Stefan, Status and Reputation Nudging (December 2, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3497462 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3497462

Michael Kirchler

University of Innsbruck ( email )

Universitätsstraße 15
Innsbruck, Innsbruck 6020
Austria

Julia Elisabeth Rose

Erasmus University ( email )

Burgemeester Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Netherlands

Stefan Palan (Contact Author)

University of Graz ( email )

Universitaetsstrasse 15/F2
Graz, 8010
Austria
+433163807306 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://academic.palan.biz

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