The Economic Effects of Political Polarization: Evidence from the Real Asset Market

81 Pages Posted: 16 Dec 2019 Last revised: 3 Apr 2023

See all articles by Ran Duchin

Ran Duchin

Boston College - Carroll School of Management

Abed El Karim Farroukh

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business

Jarrad Harford

University of Washington; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Tarun Patel

Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Finance Department

Date Written: November 17, 2021

Abstract

Politically divergent firms are considerably less likely to merge. This effect concentrates in years with high political polarization, and when firms plan to integrate their operations. The results hold after including industry-by-year and deal fixed effects, and controlling for geographical distance, product similarity, and nonpolitical differences in corporate culture or ESG policies. Following politically divergent mergers, employee turnover is higher, particularly of employees whose views misalign with the merger partner. Overall, the rise in political polarization changed the landscape of the real asset market in the U.S., with fewer mergers between politically divergent firms or firms from politically divergent states.

Keywords: JEL Classification: G34, D72 political polarization, voter registrations, campaign contributions, mergers and acquisitions, integration, employee retention

JEL Classification: G34, D72

Suggested Citation

Duchin, Ran and Farroukh, Abed El Karim and Harford, Jarrad and Patel, Tarun, The Economic Effects of Political Polarization: Evidence from the Real Asset Market (November 17, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3497907 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3497907

Ran Duchin (Contact Author)

Boston College - Carroll School of Management ( email )

140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States

Abed El Karim Farroukh

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business ( email )

United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/farroukh

Jarrad Harford

University of Washington ( email )

Box 353226
Seattle, WA 98195-3226
United States
206-543-4796 (Phone)
206-543-7472 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.washington.edu/jarrad/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Tarun Patel

Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Finance Department ( email )

United States

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