Judicial Deference to the Administration in Israel

Zhu Guobin (ed.), Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review (Springer, 2020, Forthcoming)

Hebrew University of Jerusalem Legal Research Paper 20-02

37 Pages Posted: 6 Dec 2019 Last revised: 29 Jan 2020

See all articles by Margit Cohn

Margit Cohn

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Faculty of Law

Date Written: May 22, 2019

Abstract

This article offers a conceptual analysis of the term “judicial deference”, as distinguished from other forms of judicial restraint. On this basis, first offers an overview of reliance on deference “stricto sensu” in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court when deciding on challenges to administrative action. Using textual analysis, it is shown that very few decisions consider the doctrine as such as the basis of the rejection of an application: the reasoning processes in Israel thus do not find “deference” the only, or the main, basis for refraining to interfere. This textual search leads to a definition of three theoretical justifications to deference/restraint. The subsequent qualitative study of four fields of action is followed by an assessment of the possible future of deference, which relies on two recent decisions that convey opposing possible future developments.

Keywords: judicial review, deference, administrative law, Israel, public law, judicial restraint, judicial activism

Suggested Citation

Cohn, Margit, Judicial Deference to the Administration in Israel (May 22, 2019). Zhu Guobin (ed.), Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review (Springer, 2020, Forthcoming); Hebrew University of Jerusalem Legal Research Paper 20-02. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3498444

Margit Cohn (Contact Author)

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Faculty of Law ( email )

Mount Scopus
Mount Scopus, IL 91905
Israel

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