The Politics of Randomness
21 Pages Posted: 14 Nov 2002
Date Written: October 2002
The main drawback of the public-policy contest is that the notion of contest success function, a crucial component of the contest model, does not have micro-foundations and, therefore, the random behavior of the government seems ad-hoc. In the present paper we propose a partial micro-foundation for the public-policy contest. The possible rationalization of random government behavior is illustrated in the case of the all-pay auction and Tullock's lottery logit functions. We also clarify how stake asymmetry, lobbying-skill asymmetry and return to lobbying effort determine the relative desirability, from the government's point of view, of these CSFs.
Keywords: Interest Groups, Policy Makers, Lobbying, Public-policy Contests, Contest Success Function, Rationalization of Random Government's Behavior
JEL Classification: D72, D6
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation